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3ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ
The number of British patients travelling beyond the frontiers 
of their health care jurisdiction to receive medical treatment has 
recently increased because of scarcer resources and unreasonable 
waiting times in NHS health care facilities. As the United Kingdom 
prepares for its departure from the European Union, the fl ows of medi-
cal tourists seeking health care in EU member states may become 
the object of important negotiations. The unbounded phenomenon 
of medical tourism in the atypical political and economic context of 
Brexit represents a unique opportunity to conceptualize solutions 
beyond the traditional frontiers of health care law. 
Thus, this paper proposes to take an unprecedented approach 
using a sociological framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s work on 
autopoietic systems to examine the current European legal frame-
work on cross-border health care services and to formulate a concrete 
policy proposal to achieve greater social justice in health care using 
marketplace and trade dynamics. A bilateral treaty on cross-border 
health care services taking the form of a public procurement could 
uphold universality of care and equality in treatment in the United 
Kingdom and participating European member states. Established 
contracts would offer a sustainable solution to issues of continuity of 
care, medical malpractice and may lead to signifi cant cost reduction 
in health care.
Les délais considérables en matière de santé et le nombre limité 
de ressources disponibles au sein du National Health Service (NHS) 
motivent certains patients britanniques à traverser les frontières 
de leur pays pour recevoir des traitements médicaux. Alors que le 
Royaume-Uni se prépare à quitter l’Union européenne, les fl ux de 
touristes en quête de soins de santé en Europe devront faire l’objet 
d’importantes négociations. La présente analyse adopte donc une 
approche sociologique basée sur la théorie des systèmes autopoïétiques 
de Niklas Luhman pour étudier le cadre juridique européen actuel-
lement en vigueur, et pour formuler une solution concrète mariant 
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les dynamiques du commerce international à celles des politiques de 
santé européennes et britanniques visant à accroître la justice sociale 
dans ce domaine. Le phénomène sans borne du tourisme médical et 
le contexte atypique du Brexit représentent une occasion unique 
permettant d’imaginer des solutions qui vont au-delà des frontières 
traditionnelles du droit de la santé.
L’accès universel aux soins de santé au Royaume-Uni ainsi que 
dans les États membres de l’Union européenne pourrait donc être 
préservé grâce à un traité bilatéral sur les services de santé trans-
frontaliers. Ce traité prenant la forme de contrats de marché public 
offre une solution durable aux problèmes de la continuité des soins, 
de la responsabilité médicale, et entraînera certainement une réduc-
tion signifi cative du coût des soins de santé.
*  *  *
5INTRODUCTION
Patients moving across international borders to receive medical 
services predates antiquity.1 With modernity, the number of patients 
travelling beyond the frontiers of their health care jurisdiction has 
signifi cantly increased because of scarcer resources and unreason-
able waiting times in health care facilities. Insurance companies and 
patients paying out-of-pocket arrange cross-border treatments with 
little regulatory oversight from governments and without any clearly 
established international safety standards. Nonetheless, public health 
care authorities are considering economically effi cient ways to com-
mission health care services abroad. 2 
Countries in Europe are both departure and destination points 
for these medical travellers. Medical tourists in the region fall under 
four categories. Some patients are temporary visitors or travellers 
abroad that develop a need for medical care while visiting Europe. 3 
Others are retirees that require treatment while residing in another 
European country.4 Medical tourists can also be those that travel to 
Europe on their own initiative to receive treatment, convinced that 
other European countries can provide them with higher-quality care, 
shorter waiting times, or treatment that is prohibited in their home 
country.5 Finally, because of shortages in health care provision some 
1. See Neil T. Lunt, Russell Mannion and Mark Exworthy, “A Framework for Exploring 
the Policy Implications of UK Medical Tourism and International Patient Flows” 
(2013) 47 Soc. Pol. & Adm. 1 at 3.
2. See e.g. Melisa M. Álvarez, Rupa Chanda and Richard D. Smith, “The Potential for 
Bi-Lateral Agreements in Medical Tourism: A Qualitative Study of Stakeholder 
Perspectives from the UK and India” (2011) 7 Globalization and Health 1; Leigh 
G. Turner, “Quality in Health Care and Globalization of Health Services: Accredi-
tation and Regulatory Oversight of Medical Tourism Companies” (2011) 23:1 Int. 
J. Qual. Health Care 1. 
3. See Helena Legido-Quigley et al., “Cross-Border Healthcare in the European Union: 
Clarifying Patients’ Rights” (2011) 342 B.M.J. 364, at 365.
4. Ibid.
5. See Luigi Bertinato et al., “Policy Brief: Cross-Border Health Care in Europe” (World 
Health Organization: 2005); Helena Legido-Quigley, M. McKee and E. Nolte, “Qual-
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patients have been sent abroad by their national public health author-
ities to receive specialized care.6
As the United Kingdom (UK) prepares for its departure from 
the European Union (EU), increasing fl ows of medical tourists who 
fall within the latter two categories may become the object of a trade 
negotiation. Brexit will also have wider implications for the fi nancing 
and delivery of health care services in the UK. Breaking away from 
Europe will lead to some changes in the allocation of resources within 
and outside of the National Health System (NHS). For instance, the 
provision of health care services could be impacted by the EU’s par-
ticipation in an international partnership. The Union could enter 
a free trade agreement similar to the now moribund Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and open its economic 
markets to foreign health care providers. The prices of medical servi-
ces provided in the EU would then drop, making the region an even 
more attractive destination for British medical tourists. Conversely, 
dynamics associated with a deregulation of cross-border trade could 
hamper universality of care and the social aims of the NHS in the 
(so far unlikely) event that Britain commits itself to a similar type 
of agreement with a foreign trade partner. In both scenarios, the 
deregulation of the health care marketplace would compromise fair-
ness and equality in the access to and the provision of health care 
services in the UK. 
Since its inception, the NHS has embraced a liberal egalitarian 
conception of justice in health care. Services are provided equally and 
universally to all patients based on their health status rather than 
their ability to pay. 7 In a TTIP-like scenario, however, the increasing 
number of Britons directly purchasing treatments in the EU would 
neutralize the NHS’ commissioning power essential to the universal 
provision of health care. UK residents unable to cross borders for 
treatment would see their access to services compromised. Alterna-
tively, under a UK-foreign-trade-partner type of regime, the NHS 
would see private entities take over the delivery of elective surger-
ies and minor treatments. Inevitably public funds would be strained 
and “heavy-lifting” procedures (surgeries, cancer and chronic illness 
treatments, etc.) would be left to the NHS. It is possible that patients 
will then reach a point of no return as they become unable to afford 
ity of Care, Patient Orientation, Information to Patients and Professionals” Tech-
nical Report. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London (2005). 
6. See Legido-Quigley, supra note 3 at 365.
7. See Rudolf Klein, The New Politics of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention (Oxford, 
U.K.: Radcliffe Publishing, 2013) at 1.
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private care and the NHS becomes unable to offer treatment because 
of a lack of resources. Inevitably, the two-way system would erode 
universality of care in the UK.8
In this specifi c context, the undesirable outcomes in health care 
can be explained by the different and opposite goals of free trade 
and health care public policy. Economy commits to the idea that an 
unregulated marketplace is an optimal and effi cient instrument for 
distributing scarce resources. Health care public policy, on the other 
hand, is preoccupied with social justice and equality, and tradition-
ally assumes that the allocation of important and scarce resources 
should be left in the hands of government. 9 The EU has tried to deal 
with these dynamics by mostly excluding health care and social policy 
from the trade debate. However, the UK’s imminent departure from 
the EU provides an opportunity to re-examine these confl icting goals 
and potentially reconcile them to produce greater social justice in 
health care.
In many respects, Niklas Luhmann’s theory of “autopoietic social 
systems”10 lends itself to this discussion. Luhmann conceives society 
as a complex structure consisting of many independent subsystems 
capable of adapting to turbulent environments by proceeding to 
internal changes. Luhmann’s theory also invites a refl ection on the 
confl icting goals of independent and self-reproducing social systems. 
His sociological work is valuable in determining how the regulation of 
medical tourism can bring together the two “autopoietic” (independent, 
opposite and self-reproducing) systems of free trade and health care 
public policy. Essentially, autopoietic social system theory becomes a 
sophisticated heuristic to conceptualize how health law can be taken 
outside of its “traditional frontiers” to regulate the “unbounded” phe-
nomenon of medical tourism. 
The fi rst section of the paper therefore proposes to fl esh out Luh-
mann’s sociological approach and theorizes how trade law and health 
8. Academics have argued that even currently, the presence of private providers 
threatens to dismantle the NHS. See generally David J. Hunter, “A Response 
to Rudolf Klein: A Battle May Have been Won but Perhaps Not the War” (2013) 
J. Health Politics, Policy & L. 16; Allyson Pollock, “NHS No More?” (2016) Com-
munity Practitioner 21.
9. See Christopher McCruden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Pro-
curement and Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship, 2007) at 1.
10. Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1982). See also Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, translated by John 
 Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk Baecker (California: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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care policy can increase social justice in health care in the context of 
medical tourism post-Brexit. The second section of the paper turns 
to the law regulating medical tourism and external trade relations 
in the EU to determine whether the current legal framework allows 
the use of cross-border trade arrangements to explicitly serve the dis-
tributive aspects of health care provision. Each of the presented cases 
on cross-border health care services illustrates the tension between 
cross-border trade and the foundational EU principle of  freedom 
of movement of persons (in these cases, patients) and the right of 
member states to dictate their health care policy. This portion of the 
paper unpacks how the accumulation of this jurisprudence has led to 
the enactment of Directive 2011/24/EU on Patients’ Rights in Cross 
Border Healthcare ,11 currently in force.
Finally, the paper closes on the possibility of a bilateral trade 
agreement between the UK and the EU. A UK-EU partnership on 
medical tourism could formalize the commissioning of health care 
services in EU member states to solve access issues in the NHS. The 
bilateral treaty taking the form of a public procurement would uphold 
universality of care and enhance equality in treatment on both sides. 
Established contracts would also offer a sustainable solution to issues 
of continuity of care and medical malpractice often associated with 
unregulated medical tourism. The competition among EU provid-
ers could drive down the price of treatment and indirectly increase 
access to care in the NHS. Overall, with the allocation of resources 
remaining in public hands greater social justice in health care in the 
UK and in the EU could be achieved.
Since a trade agreement pertaining to cross-border health care 
services is unchartered territory,12 the formulation of a proposal in this 
fi eld mandates an interdisciplinary approach. It is essential in order 
to consider the impact the regulation may have on British and Euro-
pean societies. Furthermore, existing literature on medical tourism has 
extensively covered the health economics of cross-border treatments 
at a regional level. It has not, however, thoroughly addressed issues 
of health care rationing or trade law to achieve solutions that can 
increase social justice in health care. 13 Recurring themes addressed 
11. E.C., Commission Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of 
patients’ right in cross-border health care [2011] O.J., L 88/45.
12. See I. Glenn Cohen, “How to Regulate Medical Tourism (and why it matters for 
Bioethics)” (2012) Developing 12:1 World Bioethics at 19.
13. See Jonathan Hanefeld et al., “What Do We Know About Medical Tourism? A 
Review of the Literature with Discussion on its Implications for the UK Nation al 
Health Service as an Example of a Public Health Care System” (2014) 21:6 J. Travel 
Medicine at 411.
 HEALTH LAW OUTSIDE ITS TRADITIONAL FRONTIERS 9
by previous studies on medical travel include: volumes of patients 
and their motivation for seeking cross-border treatment,14 the effect 
of the phenomenon on destination countries and their health care 
systems,15 as well as issues of portability of care. 16 Academic work 
in the fi eld has been mostly limited to North-South medical tourism 
and has failed to address cases of patients travelling from western 
welfare states to a neighbouring country’s mature health care system 
to seek treatment.
The impact of disruptive political and social events that may put 
greater pressure on health care systems also remains unaddressed 
by the literature.17 Brexit’s atypical conjecture provides a unique 
opportunity to fi ll this gap. The paper’s unprece dented approach 
therefore uses sociology, the European regulation of cross-border 
health care services, and trade law to formulate a concrete policy pro-
posal to achieve greater social justice in health care. This will enable 
health law to remedy the challenges posed by the unrestrained phe-
nomenon of medical tourism and to conceptualize solutions beyond 
jurisdictional frontiers.
I- SOCIAL SYSTEMS, STRUCTURAL COUPLINGS, 
AND MEDICAL TOURISM
In the 1960s, cognitive biologists Humberto Maturana and Fran-
cisco Varela developed a theory to distinguish living from non-living 
organisms. Living systems, they posited, are self-reproducing as a 
result of “autopoiesis.” 18 Put simply, autopoietic systems repeatedly 
reproduce and maintain themselves with their own elements. 19 
14. See e.g. Richard D. Smith, Chanda Rupa and Tangcharoensathien Viroj, “Trade 
in Health-Related Services” (2009) 373:9663 Lancet 593.
15. See e.g. Sameen Siddiqi et al., “Assessing Trade in Health Services in Countries 
of the Eastern Mediterranean from a Public Health Perspective” (2010) 25:3 Int. 
J. Health Plann. Manage. 231.
16. See e.g. Legido-Quigley, supra note 3.
17. See Hanefeld et al., supra note 13 at 415. 
18. Humberto R. Maturana, “The Organization of the Living: A Theory of the Living 
Organization” (1975) 7:3 Intl. J. Man-Machine Studies 313 at 150; Humberto R. 
Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization 
of the Living (Drdrecht: Reidel, 1975) [Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis]; Hum-
berto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological 
Roots of Human Understanding (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1987).
19. See David Seidl, “Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Social Systems” (2004) Lud-
wig-Maximilians-Universität München-Munich School of Management 36.
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Sociologists had unsuccessfully attempted to appropriate the 
concept20 until Nikals Luhmann made it the basis of his theory. Luh-
mann’s take on autopoiesis offers a solid alternative to the classic 
models of external agency. Traditional models understand society as 
an open system, growing and feeding off outside elements and thereby 
adapting to its environment.21 Autopoiesis in the social context, how-
ever, recognizes self-reference and recursion as fundamental to human 
society.22 Society is a complex system that is capable of adapting to 
turbulent environments by proceeding to internal changes within its 
structure.23 Self-contained, self-reproducing, and self-referencing, it is, 
itself, consisting of autopoietic subsystems (law, politics, the economy, 
etc.). These subunits also reproduce themselves through communi-
cation and their own elements.24 They are “operationally closed.”25 
Luhmann explains:
Social systems use communications as their particular mode of 
autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communications 
which are recursively produced and reproduced by a network 
of communications and which cannot exist outside of such a 
network.26
Subsystems therefore communicate within the boundaries of 
their own systems. 27 They are nonetheless capable of relationships 
with each other; Luhmann talks about “structural couplings.”28 These 
connection points lead to the coordination of structural development, 
and although operations are distinct, a subsystem’s structure can 
20. See Stafford Beer, “Preface” in Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis, supra note 18, 
63.
21. See e.g. Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems (Chicago: 
Open Court, 2011) at 13; Seidl, supra note 19 at 4.
22. See John Mingers, “Can Social Systems be Autopoietic? Assessing Luhmann’s 
Social Theory” (2002) 50:2 Sociological Rev. 278 at 279.
23. See ibid.
24. See Niklas Luhmann, “The Unity of the Legal System” in Gunther Teubner, ed., 
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: Walter de Gruy-
ter, 1988); Seidl, supra note 19 at 5; Gunther Teubner, “Introduction to Autopoie-
tic Law” in Gunther Teubner, ed., Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and 
Society (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).
25. Niklas Luhmann, “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems” in F. Geyer and J. Van der 
Zeuwen, eds, Sociocybernetic Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of 
Self-Steering Systems (London: Sage Publications, 1986) 174 at 174.
26. Ibid.
27. See Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems (Chicago: 
Open Court, 2011) at 15; Clemens Mattheis, “The System Theory of Niklas Luh-
mann and the Constitutionalization of the World Society” (2012) 4:2 Goettingen 
J. Intl. L. 625 at 629.
28. Seidl, supra note 19 at 4.
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interact with one of the other subsystems.29 As part of the same over-
arching structure (society), they are able to form many operational 
couplings. In this respect, it is possible to imagine coordinating trade 
and health care public policy’s operations to form couplings increas-
ing social justice.
Medical tourism is a phenomenon that impacts trade of services 
and, indirectly, the economy of the UK and EU member states. It also 
has signifi cant consequences for domestic health care public policy. 
From this perspective, medical tourism acts as a structural coupling 
between the two autopoietic subsystems of trade and health care 
public policy and therefore provides an interface for communication.
A. Autopoietic Subsystems: Health Care and the 
Marketplace 
Society’s subsystems are autonomous and distinct from their 
environment. They are not only self-referencing but also independent 
from the core of the social system and evolve within their own struc-
ture. The economy, politics, law, science, the media, education, and 
religion are examples of these subsystems.30 Even though they are 
stable and carry their own identity, they are also capable of  radical 
change.31
Health care is a subunit of the subsystem of politics. Politics is 
itself defi ned by its power to make collective decisions binding.32 When 
it comes to health care, politics is concerned with the distribution of 
resources, namely the fi nancing and provision of health care servi-
ces. Not only is health care a subject of politics, the unique nature 
of its resources also makes it a worthy subject of justice. In fact, the 
role health care plays in modern society, be it to alleviate suffering 
or eradicate absolute harm, makes it stand out from other generic 
goods or products. It may also be argued that health care resources 
are different as a matter of human dignity in that they are necessary 
to alleviate inherent social inequalities and enable people to fully 
 participate in their societies.33 The allocation of these resources should 
therefore follow principles of justice rather than be left in the hands 
29. See Mattheis, supra note 27 at 631.
30. See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
31. See Mingers, supra note 22 at 279.
32. See Moeller, supra note 27 at 24. 
33. See Alicia Ely Yamin, “Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in 
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health” (2009) 11:2 Health & Human 
Rights 1 at 1.
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of the market. The foundational value of fairness in access to care – 
either with the aim of providing equal life opportunities or equality 
in welfare – often motivates health care policy and dominates the 
distribution of these resources.
For example, some universal health care systems are organized 
in a manner that allows patients to have access to health care ser-
vices based on their needs rather than their means. This is the case 
with the health care systems that embrace principles of equality 
and solidarity in Europe. The WHO Ljubljana Charter on reforming 
health care in Europe states that “[h]ealth care reforms must be gov-
erned by principles of human dignity, equity, solidarity, and profes-
sional ethics.”34 It qualifi es health care as a right and highlights the 
importance of “universal coverage and equitable access [to] care [for] 
everyone.”35 In this respect, health care policy is its own autopoietic 
subsystem. Its social aims in the commissioning of services and the 
provision of care create a self-producing entity with a separate mode 
of communication based on these unique goals.
At a national level, the NHS also embraces these values of equal-
ity and universality. It is the fi rst universal health care system in the 
world to offer, through general taxation, free health care services at 
the point of use to all permanent residents in the UK. Some med-
ical professionals and politicians have also upheld the fundamental 
principle surrounding the equal provision of health care services. The 
medical profession has strongly argued that health care resources 
should not be allocated using market logic, as health care resources 
are unlike any other consumer good. In this sense, the NHS has been 
a self-reproducing system that has separated profi t from the fi nanc-
ing and delivery of health care services.
On the other hand, trade, and more particularly the international 
marketplace, also belong to a social subsystem: the economy. The 
economy is defi ned by its ambition to reduce shortage and to satisfy 
society’s needs.36 Thus, at the heart of the market lies the idea of com-
petition and deregulation. It aims to achieve maximal effi ciency by 
opening exchanges to all stakeholders. The market is an autopoietic 
subsystem that allows resources to be allocated through free exchan-
ges without any external intervention.
34. WHO, Ljublyana Charter on Reforming Health Care in Europe, European Member 
States of WHO, 19 June 1996, EUR/ICP/CARE 94 01/CN01 Rev. 1 at 5.4.
35. Ibid at 5.5. 
36. See Moeller, supra note 27 at 23.
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In this regard, the deregulation associated with free trade and 
the marketplace may be incompatible with the social aims of health 
care public policies. Health care systems in Europe are traditionally 
publicly fi nanced and organized with oversight from governments, 
leaving little to no place for trade dynamics and market forces. Con-
sidering the successive waves of health care reforms in Britain and 
the inability of governments to tackle health care scarcity issues,37 
one may ask whether public authorities should hold the monopoly on 
the allocation of health care resources. Perhaps universal access to 
care could be better achieved and maintained with innovative tools 
offered by the marketplace.
The answer to these queries may lie in the regulation of growing 
fl ows of cross-border medical travels in and out of the United King-
dom that will force structural couplings, i.e. interactions between the 
independent structures of trade dynamics and public health care policy. 
Benefi ts could potentially be derived from the market with the appro-
priate degree of regulation. Historically, the internal organization of 
the NHS has proven that communication between these autopoietic 
systems can achieve some social justice in health care.
Couplings also become more visible through spectacular events 
that disrupt the system, as was the case for the structural couplings 
that were created within the structure of the NHS during the 1990s, 
as further discussed below. Similarly, the UK’s departure from the 
EU may create suffi cient disturbance to bring structural couplings 
to the surface.
37. See David J. Hunter, The Health Debate (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008) at 2.
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B. Existing Structural Couplings within the NHS
Founded on William Beveridge’s ideal of a unifi ed system based 
on national solidarity, equality, and universalism, the NHS has pro-
vided the entire British population with health care services since 
1948. Since then, successive waves of health care reforms have led to 
the redesign of parts of its fi nancing and delivery structure. One of 
the biggest overhauls took place during a period of radical reforms in 
the 1980s. The purchaser-provider divide was introduced to palliate 
ineffi ciencies in the health and social system. The idea was to emu-
late the private sector and offer the possibility of bidding for NHS 
contracts to trigger more competition and drive down the prices of 
health care services. This resulted in the creation of a publicly man-
aged health-care trading place. Although it was based on economic 
principles, universality of care was preserved and equality to access 
was upheld.38
Thus, the seemingly irreconcilable structural attributes of health 
care public policy and the marketplace have already been brought 
together within the NHS. Principles borrowed from the economic sub-
system were used to work towards achieving social goals. In 1991, 
strategic health authorities were given the role of purchasing health 
care services from NHS trusts and general practitioners. These enti-
ties had to commission the best services available, irrespective of 
whether they were dispensed by private or public providers. Their 
only goal was to cater to the population’s health care needs. On the 
provider side, hospitals (as NHS trusts) had to provide services com-
missioned by health authorities and General Practitioners fundhold-
ing practices. The delivery, purchasing, and planning functions of the 
NHS were then separated.39
Initially, the population and medical professionals were averse 
to this drastic policy change. Doctors criticized the introduction of 
market dynamics in health care and social policy. The importance of 
“value for money” as the basis for provision contracts did not sit well 
with the medical profession. Doctors disapproved of the process and 
of the non-medical considerations they had to balance while deciding 
on a course of treatment. They felt that clinical independence was 
under threat.40 They were eventually forced to concede that the NHS’ 
core principle of universality of care based on equality in access were 
38. See Klein, supra note 7 at 155. 
39. See Howard Davies and Hugh Powell, “How to Ration Health Care-and be 
 Re-Elected: The UK Experience” (1991) 3 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 138 at 142.
40. See ibid at 143.
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unchallenged. The means used to achieve equality in health care were 
simply different.41
The NHS purchaser-provider divide is a compelling example of 
potential structural couplings between market dynamics and health 
care public policy. Despite its operative closures, the subsystem of 
health care public policy opened up to market dynamics and environ-
mental perturbations were certainly a catalyst to this opening. Per-
haps the new political and economic climate brought by the UK’s 
departure from the EU could also lead to contact between these auto-
poietic subsystems. Similarly, British public health authorities could 
procure health care from EU member states and improve access to 
care through medical tourism and trade dynamics.
II- THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL TOURISM AND 
EXTERNAL TRADE RELATIONS IN THE EU
The European Economic Community, established in 1957 and 
succeeded by the EU in 1992, has facilitated the movement of per-
sons within the European space.42 Over time, regulation to deal with 
increasing fl ows of patients associated with the free movement policy 
was developed. More specifi cally, a legal framework for citizens seek-
ing reimbursement of treatments provided in member states outside 
of their health care jurisdiction was established.43 In parallel, the EU 
has become a signifi cant economic power and developed an impor-
tant external trade policy such that rules governing external relations 
with foreign trade partners had to be refi ned. Both of these regulatory 
frameworks will certainly come into play when constructing post-
Brexit relationships around trade and medical services.
A. European Regulation of Medical Tourism
The principle of subsidiarity used to allocate areas of compe-
tence between the EU and its member states has indirectly led to 
some interference with domestic policy making. EU regulation applies 
 directly to member states in the same way as laws enacted through 
the domestic legislative process. The European corpus also super-
sedes any confl icting domestic law. This is valid for laws governing 
health care services, even though the organization and delivery of 
41. See Klein, supra note 7 at 159. 
42. See David Botterill, Guido Pennings and Tomas Mainil, eds, Medical Tourism and 
Transnational Health Care (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 134.
43. See ibid.
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health and medical care is considered to fall under the purview of 
the member states.44 As a result, member states have had to accom-
modate EU law’s principle of free movement of persons45 impacting 
decisions regarding the allocation of health care resources within 
their national health care systems.
Since 2011, the Directive46 has established a basic legal frame-
work to regulate the provision of cross-border health care services 
in the EU. The legislation covers treatments regularly offered to 
patients by their health care jurisdiction but that have been provided 
in another member state, regardless of how those services are organ-
ized, fi nanced, or delivered. The Directive also requires that member 
states provide safe and high-quality care in their territory and that 
cross-border services be provided according to domestic safety and 
quality standards.47 The UK has complied with this legislation and 
therefore grants its citizens the right to hospital stays in other member 
states without advance authorization. In cases of emergencies, the UK 
also commits to reimbursing health care services up to the amount 
that would have been provided by the NHS.
The Directive is the result of jurisprudence presented before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) from 1998 to 2003.48 The rulings 
of the joint cases of Kohll and Decker (1998)49 and of Geraets-Smits 
and Peerbooms (2001), 50 as well as the latest case of Watts (2006)51 
constitute the essence of the Directive. Prior to the Directive’s enact-
ment, Regulation 1408/71 (and later Regulation 883/2004) allowed the 
reimbursement of emergency care received during temporary visits to 
another member state via the E111 system, and later via the European 
health insurance card system.52 Non-emergency “scheduled” care or 
44. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2007), 
[2012] O.J. C. 326/47, art. 168 [TFEU]. 
45. See ibid, art. 21.
46. See Directive 2011/24, supra note 11.
47. See Legido-Quigley et al., supra note 3 at 365. 
48. Article 56 Treaty of the Functioning European Union “allowed the Court to com-
pensate for the lack of specific rules on cross-border healthcare.”
49. E.C.J. Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931 
[Kohll]; E.C.J. Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, Case C-120/95, 
[1998] E.C.R. I-1831 [Decker].
50. E.C.J. B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms 
v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-12403 
[Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms]. 
51. E.C.J. The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care 
Trust, Secretary of State of Health, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325 [Watts].
52. See I. Glenn Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law, and Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 169.
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“pre-authorized care” was only indirectly regulated by the evolving 
ECJ rulings in the cases presented below.53
1. Kohll and Decker
In Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, the request of a Lux-
embourg national to pre-authorize his daughter’s orthodontic treat-
ment in Germany was rejected because of a lack of urgency. However, 
in the joint case of Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, 
Nicolas Decker, another Luxembourger, obtained reimbursement 
for prescription glasses he had purchased in Belgium without his 
 government’s prior authorization.54 
In both cases, the ECJ was asked to determine whether require-
ments for pre-authorization were subject to the freedom of movement 
provisions under Articles 49 and 50 of the European Community 
Treaty.55 The Court found that the reasons given to justify the restric-
tions on free movement were insuffi cient. It stated that prior authori-
zation was creating a barrier to the free movement of patients. Neither 
public health nor the fi nancial stability of health care systems could 
justify the infringement of this principle.56 The Court also added 
that Regulation 1208/71, which mandates reimbursement based on 
the tariffs of the member state where the treatment was received, 
did not have to be interpreted as preventing patients from seeking 
reimbursement at a domestic rate from their government.57
The Court stated that although member states have the free-
dom to regulate and organize their own social security systems, they 
must do so in accordance with the principle of free movement of per-
sons. Both cases made clear that the autonomy of member states to 
oversee the distribution of health care resources is confi ned to the 
boundaries set by EU law, unless the general interest of the popula-
tion requires derogation.58
53. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 135. 
54. See Robert F. Rich and Kelly R. Merrick, “Cross-Border Health Care in the Euro-
pean Union: Challenges and Opportunities” (2006) 23 J. Contemp. Health L. & 
Pol’y 64 at 7.
55. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 172.
56. See Kohll, supra note 49 at 46; Decker, supra note 49 at 56-60.
57. See I. Glenn Cohen, “Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the 
Patient Protective Argument” (2010) 95 Iowa L. Rev. 10 at 1467. See also Cohen, 
supra note 52 at 172.
58. See Rich and Merrick, supra note 54 at 9.
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Kohll and Decker are foundational cases because they illustrate 
how in reality, two separate and autonomous systems must adapt 
and fi nd points of contact to survive. The Court had to reconcile the 
common market, which promoted freedom of exchange within the EU, 
with member states’ social policy, which was concerned with the health 
care needs of their populations. The tension between these autopoietic 
systems is relayed in the ruling. Friction between these systems gave 
rise to an interesting structural coupling. Cross-border health care 
is no longer the privilege of those who can afford to travel to receive 
treatment; it has become a universal right for all EU citizens.59
2. Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms
In 2001, the ECJ heard two other cases relating to prior autho-
rization. The Court issued a single judgment for Geraets-Smits v. 
Stichting Ziekenfonds and Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgver-
zekeringen. In Geraets-Smits, a Dutch national received treatment 
for his Parkinson’s disease in Germany without prior authorization 
from his government. After paying for the treatment, he turned to 
the Netherlands Sickness Fund for reimbursement. In Peerbooms, a 
Dutch national went to Austria to receive neurological treatment that 
was only available on an experimental basis in the Netherlands. He 
also sought reimbursement from the government post-treatment. In 
both cases, reimbursement was denied for failure to follow the prior 
authorization procedure and because both treatments were already 
available in the patients’ health care jurisdiction.60
The Netherlands’ health care system is organized on a benefi t-
in-kind basis. Patients are entitled to receive treatment only from 
providers that have contracted in advance with the National Sickness 
Fund. Thus, the ECJ had to determine whether the criteria set out 
in Decker and Kohll, based on a reimbursement system, also applied 
to the benefi t-in-kind structure and to hospital care. The Court ruled 
consistently in that it also found the prior-authorization requirement 
to be in violation of articles 49 and 50 in these cases.61
The Court stated that member states were only entitled to 
withhold authorization in circumstances where an equally effective 
treatment was available without “undue delay” in the patient’s home 
59. See ibid at 7. 
60. See ibid at 8. 
61. Ibid.
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country.62 For this, an evaluation of the patient’s present and past 
conditions had to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The authoriza-
tion scheme had to be non-discriminatory and based on non-arbitrary 
criteria disclosed to the patient ahead of her application.63
The ECJ recognized differences between hospital and outpatient 
services and stated that removing the requirement of prior autho-
rization for inpatient care could seriously endanger the organiza-
tion of health care systems in the EU by undermining the domestic 
allocation of health care resources and the organization of the social 
and care systems.64 In fact, the Court acknowledged that “if insured 
persons were at liberty, regardless of the circumstances, to use the 
services of hospitals with which their sickness insurance fund had no 
contractual arrangements, whether they were situated in the Neth-
erlands or in another Member State, all the planning which goes 
into the contractual system in an effort to guarantee a rationalized, 
stable, balanced and accessible supply of hospital services would be 
jeopardized at a stroke.”65
These cases highlight once again the tension between the orga-
nization of the national system and dynamics of rationing, particularly 
in the domain of hospital services and freedom of movement in the EU. 
On a different but equally important level, the friction between the 
autopoietic systems of health care policy and the common market is at 
the heart of this decision. The Court recognizes that cross- border care 
in the EU should be balanced against the sustainability of member 
states’ social systems. Freedom of movement should not be endanger-
ing the organization of health care systems and inversely, member 
states should not arbitrarily restrict their citizens’ freedom to seek 
treatment outside their health care jurisdiction.66
Following these joint cases, the ECJ also addressed the question 
of the reimbursement rate in Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des 
Mutualités Chrétiennes.67 In this case, the Court determined that the 
patients were entitled to whichever reimbursement rate was higher 
62. Ibid.
63. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 175.
64. See Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 50 at 76-80.
65. Ibid at 81.
66. See Rich and Merrick, supra note 54 at 13.
67. E.C.J. Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v. Alliance nationale des mutualités chré-
tiennes, Case C-368/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-5382.
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between the rate in their home country, the member state of affi lia-
tion, or the rate in the member state where they sought treatment.68
3. Watts
Ms. Watts, a patient of the NHS, was seeking authorization to 
have her hip-replacement surgery performed in France to avoid the 
UK’s waiting list. Her initial request was denied by the NHS (the 
Bedford Primary Care Trust) on the grounds that the surgery could 
be performed in the UK within an acceptable one-year delay.69 Due to 
her deteriorating health, she was moved up the waiting list and given 
priority status with a waiting time of three to four months. Despite 
the shorter delay, she went to France to promptly receive the treat-
ment. Upon her return her reimbursement claim was denied. She 
then sought judicial review of the decision.70 
The Court took this as an opportunity to further clarify the rules 
on prior authorization. It held that although it is usually a require-
ment for the reimbursement of cross-border health care services, prior 
authorization should not be unnecessarily withheld. It restated the 
criteria established under Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and added 
that the process had to be easily accessible to patients, timely, and 
challengeable in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.71
The Court acknowledged that the process was necessary to pro-
vide health care authorities with some visibility for planning and 
allocation purposes. However, the ECJ held that the fact that an 
intervention could be performed within government-mandated wait-
ing time did not alone constitute a ground for dismissal. A case-by-
case analysis had to be conducted by health authorities to determine 
whether the delay was acceptable or whether it required that the 
patient seek cross-border health care.72 It may have been useful for 
national authorities to put together a list of acceptable waiting times 
for common procedures to have an informal but objective guidelines 
based on clinical factors.73
68. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 176.
69. Gareth Davies, “The Effect of Mrs Watts’ Trip to France on the National Health 
Service” (2007) 18:1 King’s L.J. 158 at 159.
70. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 176; Gareth Davies, “The Effect of Mrs Watts’ Trip 
to France on the National Health Service” (2007) 18:1 King’s L.J. 158 at 159. 
71. See Davies, supra note 69 at 161.
72. See Watts, supra note 51 at 3.
73. See Davies, supra note 69 at 165.
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The case of Watts also affi rmed that patients are entitled to 
the full reimbursement of the cost of treatment received in another 
member state and that inextricably linked expenses such as travel and 
accommodation costs may be covered by the member state of affi lia-
tion. This applies regardless of whether the treatment was available 
free of cost in the home country.74
The Watts case certainly created controversy at the European 
and national level. The culture of the NHS, based on equality of col-
lective benefi ts, was challenged by the principle of free movement. 
Contrary to previous cases, the patient’s interests were the heart of 
the decision rather than health care public policy itself, such that 
individual justice trumped social justice.75
4. EU Directive 2011/24
The ECJ’s jurisprudence from 1998 to 2006 was unifi ed by the 
2011 Directive. Even though this legislation does not create a unique 
health care system across the EU, it nevertheless requires member 
states to reimburse, at the domestic rate, health care services pro-
vided to their nationals in any other EU country. The requirement to 
pre-authorization in particular circumstances (art. 8) and the exclu-
sive competency of member states over the fi nancing and delivery of 
domestic health care services are also guaranteed.76 The Directive 
focused only on scheduled care since emergency services had already 
been addressed by Regulation 883/2004.77
More specifi cally, the Directive reaffi rms the ruling in Watts 
and requires that the denial of prior authorization be justifi ed and 
restricted. The Directive mentions that it should be limited to instan-
ces in which it is necessary to achieve objectives relating to the 
balancing of a member state’s social security budget, or to cater to 
fi nancial planning needs. It should never be arbitrarily withheld as 
this would constitute a violation of the fundamental principle of free 
movement of patients.78 
According to Article 8(6) of the Directive, a member state can 
only deny prior authorization in four cases:79 (1) if, according to a 
74. See Watts, supra note 51 at 143.
75. See Davies, supra note 69 at 163.
76. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 135.
77. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 179.
78. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 180.
79. See Directive 2011/24, supra note 46, art. 8(6).
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clinical assessment, the patient would be exposed to unacceptable 
risks that outweigh the treatment’s benefi ts, (2) if the general public 
would be exposed to a substantial safety hazard as a result of the 
treatment, (3) if the standards and treatment guidelines raise seri-
ous concerns for the patient’s safety, and (4) if the treatment sought 
abroad is already available in the domestic health care jurisdiction 
within a reasonable limit. Even for treatments that are not typically 
available, member states are not automatically under the obligation 
to grant prior authorization if the patient can be treated within a 
medically acceptable delay.80
With regard to costs, it is at the discretion of the state of autho-
rization to reimburse any expenses that would not have been covered 
had the patient been treated in his or her health care jurisdiction. 
Accommodation or travel costs may be paid directly to the patient 
in cases where he or she would have been assumed by the domestic 
health care jurisdiction had treatment been provided at home.81
The Directive also expands patients’ protection rights. Health 
care providers are required to supply information to help patients 
choose among different treatment options. This includes informa-
tion on availability, quality, safety, and prices of health care services. 
Member states providing treatments must also ensure that recourse 
for compensation is made available to patients in cases of medical 
errors or malpractice. Patients’ personal data must also be protected 
in compliance with EU standards. Finally, member states are respon-
sible for post-treatment care in cases where it would have been made 
available to the patient had the treatment been provided at home.82 
Overall, the legislation calls for mutual assistance and co-operation 
among EU member states to coordinate safety, quality of treatment, 
and information sharing.
The regulation of cross-border health care services in Europe 
arose out of pure economic interest with a desire to safeguard free 
movement of patients rather than placing emphasis on their health 
care rights. Paradoxically, the Directive defi nes the phenomenon as 
a citizen’s right rather than something pertaining to market dynam-
ics. The Directive exemplifi es how health care policy and the market 
place have come together in the area of medical tourism.83
80. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 182.
81. See ibid at 183.
82. See Directive 2011/24, supra note 46, art. 4(2). 
83. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 133.
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B. EU Regulation of External Trade Relations
The EU constitutes the world’s largest trading partner, account-
ing for 16.5 percent of imports-exports worldwide in 2016.84 Exter-
nal trade partners are drawn to the region because of the lucrative 
opportunities that the internal market represents. Also, the EU’s 
capacity to negotiate free trade agreements with a single voice with 
the Common Commercial Policy (CPP) provides signifi cant economic 
power to the 28 EU member states.85
It was soon after the inception of the European Common Market 
that external trade policy departed from the European Community’s 
initial inward-looking strategy. The EU progressively embraced a more 
aggressive free trade agenda, promoting multilateral and bilateral 
agreements and deep integration.86 Along with its policy’s evolution, 
the regulation of EU external trade has also progressed to help real-
ize the region’s economic ambitions.
EU institutions are competent to act on behalf of member 
states where treaties have expressly conferred on them the power to 
do so. Article 5 of the Treaty of the European Union87 grants, under 
the CCP, the European Commission the exclusive power to enter into 
trade agreements on behalf of the Member States. This signifi cantly 
encroaches on member states’ domestic trade powers as over time, 
the CCP has become quasi-all-encompassing.88 In fact, the scope of 
the CCP has been the object of much debate. Article 110 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community stated that the policy 
should “aim to contribute in the common interest, to the harmonious 
trade and the lowering of customs barriers.”89 Unfortunately, the pro-
vision did not expand on the nature of these economic exchanges or 
whether the CCP extended beyond the traditional trade of goods.90
It was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty 
of Nice (2001) that trade of services was defi ned as an integral part 
84. See Official Website of the European Union, “Trade” (March 2016), online: <https://
europa.eu/european-union/topics/trade_en>. 
85. See Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflict ed 
Trade Power” (2006) 13:6 J. European Public Policy 906 at 906.
86. See Billy A. Melo Aranjo, The EU Deep Trade Agenda: Law and Policy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016) at 13.
87. Consolidated in the TFEU, supra note 44,
88. See Aranjo, supra note 86 at 50. 
89. Treaty establishing the European Community, [1957] O.J., C. 224/7, art. 110(1) 
[TEEC].
90. See ibid at 58. 
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of the CCP.91 Trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational 
services, and social and human health services still constituted a 
major caveat as they remained under the shared competences of 
the European Community and the member states.92 In the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2007),93 however, references to shared competences in these 
areas were removed. Commentators have since concluded that the 
entirety of trade in services should be interpreted as falling under 
the exclusive competence of the European Commission.94
Thus, despite their sensitive qualities,95 health care services are 
now interpreted as falling under the CPP. In the event of post-Brexit 
negotiations for an agreement on cross-border health care services 
between the UK and the EU, the European Commission would have 
the power to act on behalf of the 27 member states. This would cer-
tainly simplify the process and avoid the negotiation of 27 bilateral 
agreements between the UK and each EU member state. The 2011 
Directive also facilitates the task, as it offers an ideal template to 
build on by addressing issues of health care system organization, 
movement, and health and safety of patients. 
III- MEDICAL TOURISM: A CURRENCY TO ACHIEVE 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE POST-BREXIT?
Waves of incoming medical travellers seeking high quality med-
ical treatments in the UK and inversely, British patients turning to 
other medical jurisdictions to receive care, have signifi cantly increased 
since the 1990s. In vitro fertilization, cosmetic and dental surgery, 
organ and tissue transplantation, and orthopaedic and bariatric 
surgery are among the most sought-after medical interventions.96 
Europe’s geographical proximity makes it a prime destination for 
British medical tourists. The availability of care in Europe is signifi -
91. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and certain related acts, [1997] O.J., C. 340/1; 
Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, [2001] O.J., C. 80/1.
92. TEEC, supra 89.
93. TFEU, supra note 44. 
94. See Aranjo, supra note 86 at 58.
95. As discussed in Part I.A, health care services in many European welfare states 
are deemed to have particular features that make them stand out from other 
goods or products. Accordingly, their distribution should not be purely subject to 
market forces, but rather requires the oversight of public powers. However, from 
a trade law perspective, health care services are deemed to fall under the same 
category as any other goods or services.
96. See Lunt, Mannion and Exworthy, supra note 1 at 2.
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cantly greater because of the vastly different array of services and 
technologies offered in each country. Furthermore, in line with the 
EU Directive, British patients can now seek reimbursement from the 
NHS to cover the cost of treatments provided in other EU countries.
However, as the UK exits the EU, the Directive will no longer 
regulate or facilitate cross-border treatments for British patients in 
the European space. It is therefore likely that unregulated medical 
tourism will increase. This could have devastating effects on access 
to care domestically and in the EU. Local European populations may 
see their health care resources diminished because of British or other 
medical tourists jeopardizing the organization of European social 
security frameworks and creating a parallel system of private care. 
As previously mentioned, the planning and allocation of health care 
resources for the NHS could also be affected. The lack of regulation 
could be particularly detrimental to individuals who cannot afford 
treatment abroad and who remain subject to lengthy waiting times 
in the UK.
Regardless of whether the procedures are reimbursed by the 
national system or paid by patients out-of-pocket, post-treatment 
complications will also continue to give rise to signifi cant costs for 
the NHS. Without the appropriate framework, physicians following 
up on medical interventions provided abroad will still not have access 
to crucial information relating to the course of treatment. Cases of 
medical malpractice in the cross-border health care context will con-
tinue to pose a challenge.
As explained below, the reasons for regulating medical cross-bor-
der health care between the UK and the EU reveal that a bilateral 
framework is best suited to address these issues. They also reveal 
how trade dynamics are capable of serving the social justice aims of 
health care public policy in the UK and the EU, if structured in the 
form of public procurement contracts for the purchase of health care 
services. The law will allow these autopoietic systems to fi nd common 
ground and provide a structural coupling in the form of a bilateral 
trade agreement on cross-border health care.
A. Reasons to Regulate Medical Tourism…
The UK’s departure from the EU may be providing an unfore-
seen opportunity to tackle cross-border health care in an innovative 
manner. It is worth examining in more detail the reasons supporting 
the regulation of UK-EU medical tourism through a bilateral agree-
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ment to better lay out how trade dynamics and a public procurement 
structure can help serve these objectives.
1. A More Just Allocation of Resources
In the absolute, more patients seeking interventions abroad 
should result in shorter waiting lists and better access to care for all. 
However, the medical exodus of privileged patients will inevitably 
result in the erosion of the NHS social contract and in crippling the 
foundational egalitarian principle of universality of care. Wealthier 
medical travellers will eventually refuse to fi nance the public system 
and elect to pay out-of-pocket for all of their medical treatments. This 
will challenge the taxation system that fi nances health care services 
in the UK.
Regulation on cross-border health care services may actually 
increase patient mobility and bring populations closer to the spe-
cialized treatments that are not currently available in the UK. It 
could also lead to savings for the NHS. EU member states are likely 
to offer competitive bids to obtain NHS procurement contracts and 
offer more affordable services. Overall, access within the UK and 
abroad could be improved by commissioning health care of services 
from providers in the EU.97
A bilateral framework could alleviate pressures on the British 
health care system and decrease treatment waiting times. The NHS’s 
planning and fi nancing of patients’ medical travels would allow for 
clear benchmarks to be established. A set number of patients would 
be linked to EU medical facilities and accounted for under the health 
care policy budget. Scheduled interventions would also help member 
states plan their budget and determine the resources they wish to 
allocate to the treatment of British medical tourists. It would pre-
vent the creation of a private and parallel system of care for medical 
tourists that could erode social justice in these treatment countries.98
2. Consistent Treatment of Complications and Continuity 
of Care
The exact fi nancial burden that post-treatment complications 
have had on the NHS has not been precisely quantifi ed. However, 
97. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 145; Mark Exworthy and 
Stephen Peckham, “Access, Choice and Travel: Implications for Health Policy” 
(2006) 40:3 Social Policy & Administration 267 at 269.
98. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, ibid.
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issues affecting patients after their medical travels are frequent and 
considered by NHS medical practitioners as undesirable side effects 
of cross-border treatment.99
Patients travelling to receive treatment at a more affordable 
cost may become suspicious of the quality of care they are receiving 
and feel more vulnerable or prone to complications. However, there 
are no correlations between the cost of treatment and its quality. It 
is often the lack of a constant fl ow of information between primary 
care physicians in the UK and treating doctors abroad that increases 
the need for follow-up visits upon a patient’s return.100 A bilateral 
agreement could establish a protocol for NHS patients to be closely 
followed by medical professionals in the UK. This would keep the 
communication channels open. Incidents relating to a loss of med-
ical records or miscommunication on the course of treatment would 
therefore be signifi cantly reduced.101
3. Reducing Incidence of Medical Errors and Malpractice 
Information asymmetry between medical professionals and 
patients are exacerbated in the context of medical tourism. Complex 
medical jargon coupled with a language barrier put patients at a 
 signifi cant risk. They are often unable to assess the quality of care 
or the necessity of treatment, having foregone any consultation with 
their primary care providers prior to departure. Informed-consent 
rules and pretreatment counselling are generally omitted.102 The 
patient’s medical history which relays potential risk factors is often 
unknown by the treating doctor.103
Standard of care and medical malpractice laws vary in treat-
ment countries. Patients are sometimes left with no recourse to obtain 
 compensation or indemnifi cation for the harm they suffered.104 Lan-
guage and cultural barriers often hinder a patient’s capacity to gain 
access to justice in a foreign jurisdiction and receive adequate com-
pensation. Medical professionals following up on treatment delivered 
abroad have also expressed concerns about engaging their liabil-
99. See Hanefeld et al., supra note 13 at 413; Turner, supra note 2 at 2. 
100. See Lunt, Mannion and Exworthy, supra note 1 at 7. 
101. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 145.
102. See Lunt, Mannion and Exworthy, supra note 1 at 8. 
103. See Botterill, Pennings and Mainil, supra note 42 at 145.
104. See Neil Lunt, Stephen T. Green, Russell Mannion and Daniel Horsfall, “Qual-
ity, Safety and Risk in Medical Tourism” in Michael C. Hall, Medical Tourism: 
The Ethics, Regulation, and Marketing of Health Mobility (London, U.K.: Rout-
ledge, 2013) 31 at 36.
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ity.105 Thus, a bilateral agreement would provide a clear pathway 
for continuity of care and a framework to deal with cases of medical 
malpractice without necessarily engaging the responsibility of NHS 
medical professionals.106
B. With a Bilateral Trade Agreement
The values of equality and universality of care that are the 
cornerstone of the NHS resonate with the EU’s fundamental principles. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union mentions that 
external actions must contribute “to the sustainable development of 
the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair 
trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights.”107 
The government’s participation in the market with the goal of regulat-
ing exchanges to achieve greater social justice refl ects these ideals. The 
possibility of a bilateral trade agreement on cross-border health care 
services between the UK and the EU should therefore be addressed.
This agreement could take the form of a series of public pro-
curement contracts: agreements that are designed to structure public 
powers’ purchase of goods and services.108 In the case of a post-Brexit 
UK, this could translate into having groups who are in charge of com-
missioning health care services for the NHS purchase and arrange 
treatments in EU member states’ health care facilities. These contracts 
would be structured in terms that would provide a sustainable solution 
to issues of continuity of care and medical malpractice. Furthermore, 
the competition among the EU bidders would lead to lower prices for 
treatments and indirectly better access to care.
1. The Public Procurement Structure
Similar to the purchaser-provider model of the NHS, a bilateral 
agreement in the form of public procurement contracts will create 
structural couplings between the autopoietic systems of the econ-
omy and politics. Trade of health care services will be regulated in 
order to achieve health care public policy’s social justice aims. Public 
purchasing power and market forces will come together to improve 
the allocation of resources and increase patients’ safety and well- 
105. See Rory Johnston et al., “Canadian Family Doctors’ Roles and Responsibilities 
Toward Outbound Medical Tourists: ‘Our True Role Is... Within the Confines of 
our System’”(2013) 59:12 Cdn. Family Physician 1314.
106. See Lunt, Mannion and Exworthy, supra note 1 at 8-9.
107. TFEU, supra note 44 at art. 3.
108. See Aranjo, supra note 86 at 203. 
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being. However, trading health care services should not result in the 
commodifi cation of these unique resources, as this could endanger 
universality of care in the UK and EU member states. The commis-
sioning of services outside of the NHS has to remain a governmental 
prerogative.109 In economic terms, this would result in abandoning 
the logic of Pareto effi ciency where better health care for certain 
patients results in sacrifi cing resources for others, in order to build 
on comparative advantage dynamics resulting in more affordable 
health care and better allocation of resources in the UK and partici-
pating EU countries.
Periodically, the NHS will budget for a set number of patients 
in need of costly medical interventions to be sent to EU facilities to 
receive specialized care at a competitive price. Standard operating 
procedures will be established to guarantee continuity of care and 
facilitate the communication between British medical professionals 
and EU treating doctors. Competitive bids from EU member states 
will lead to lower costs for treatments and more effective health care 
planning on the part of the NHS. EU countries’ social security systems 
will not be compromised by a two-way system because of the limited 
number of interventions. On the contrary, EU member states will be 
able to plan the allocation of these resources and redistribute the 
earnings within their own health care services. The market for cross- 
border care will thereby be indirectly regulated by NHS procurement 
contracts without hampering competitive forces or social justice.110
2. The Concrete Provisions
The NHS will no longer be put in a position to assume uniden-
tifi able costs for patients seeking medical procedures in Europe. The 
amount of trade will be formalized under the agreement to account 
for the number of patients, specifi c health facilities, and the negoti-
ated prices. Certainty relating to the price of treatment and patient 
numbers will not only facilitate fi nancial planning but also make for 
a more transparent process. Altogether, bilateral trade will facilitate 
a more just allocation of NHS resources.111
Patients’ freedom of choice will not be signifi cantly limited. The 
overarching agreement could establish a network of European pro-
viders that allows patients to be sent to the medical facility providing 
109. See Ramya M. Vijaya, “Medical Tourism: Revenue Generation or International 
Transfer of Healthcare Problems?” (2010) 44:1 J. Economic Issues 53 at 56.
110. See McCruden, supra note 9 at 25.
111. See Álvarez, Chanda and Smith, supra note 2 at 6. 
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the most appropriate treatment for their condition. Most often, cross- 
border patients pose a challenge to their primary care physicians who 
are unable to “gatekeep” access to specialized care abroad. Therefore, 
an upstream standard operating procedure will be embedded in the 
agreement.112
Participating medical facilities will be authorized to treat NHS 
patients only if it is established that the quality of care they offer is 
up to NHS standards. An accreditation system could also be part of 
the agreement to avoid exposing patients and the local population to 
health risks. A common standard of training and practice for phys-
icians working in these facilities could also be covered under the agree-
ment, as well as a procedure for incidents of medical malpractice.113 
The British government and participating member states would con-
tribute to a no-fault compensation fund to indemnify patients thereby 
avoiding unnecessary litigation costs for the NHS and the patients.
Electronic record keeping and sharing between the NHS refer-
ring doctors and EU treating physicians will facilitate continuity of 
care and reduce incidences of medical errors. The pre-established com-
munication between the different members of a treatment team and a 
mandatory visit to a primary care doctor upon return will also signifi -
cantly reduce costs associated with post-treatment complications.114
CONCLUSION
In previous studies, emphasis was put on patients’ movements 
across physical and virtual (in the case of the EU) geographical bound-
aries to receive treatment. Flows of patients from the “north” seeking 
treatment in another mature health care system were unaccounted 
for. Consequences of medical tourism on the domestic health care 
jurisdictions were, for the most part, left in the background. There-
fore, in addition to highlighting growing trends in medical travel, this 
paper has adopted a sociological approach to the regulation of med-
ical tourism. This has allowed for a trans-systemic view of the issues 
to emerge. The autopoietic systems of public health care policy and 
the marketplace will have to form structural couplings to help the 
British and other European health care systems communicate more 
effectively and provide fairer access to care for Britons and Europeans.
112. See Johnston, et al., supra note 105 at 113. 
113. See Lunt, Mannion and Exworthy, supra note 1 at 9. 
114. See ibid at 9. 
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Medical tourism is defi ned as a transnational phenomenon, and 
even though Brexit is a clear step towards restoring borders between 
the UK and the EU, now more than ever before, it mandates a cer-
tain degree of regulation to ensure patient safety, uniformity of care 
and a just allocation of health care resources. This new and atypical 
political and economic context provides a perfect storm to build an 
adequate legal framework, and most importantly, to achieve greater 
social justice in health care.
Indeed, the UK’s departure from the EU will create import-
ant disruptions that will force trade and public health policy to be 
re-examined. Brexit will trigger an overhaul in the NHS as resour-
ces become scarcer with the changing economic context. Niklas Luh-
mann’s autopoietic systems theory provides an excellent backdrop 
for theorizing how seemingly irreconcilable systems can be brought 
together. It demonstrates how disruptive events are capable of cre-
ating pathways for communication and therefore potentially solving 
access and scarcity issues in health care. Medical tourism may be an 
avenue to bridge trade and public health policy as the British govern-
ment turns to the EU to form a partnership to regulate cross-border 
health care services.
The current European legal framework allows for trade arrange-
ments to serve the distributive aspect of health care provision. 
Although freedom of movement remains at the core of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence, it does not preclude a more concrete framework for the 
delivery of care in the EU to be established. The series of cases lead-
ing to the enactment of the Directive illustrate the tension between 
the economic goals of the Union and the right of European citizens to 
access health care services throughout the EU, regardless of national 
borders. It also provides insight on the regulation of potentially the 
largest market for medical tourism and how publicly fi nanced health 
care systems are affected by this phenomenon.115 European trade 
law, for its part, interprets health care services as falling within the 
competences of the EU and thus allows for a more straightforward 
and direct negotiation process between the UK and the European 
Commission.
A free trade agreement on medical tourism taking the form of 
a public procurement could provide suffi cient structural couplings 
to have trade and public health care policy enter into a dialogue to 
115. See Cohen, supra note 52 at 170.
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achieve greater social justice in the UK and the EU. A trade agree-
ment on medical tourism would certainly improve equality in access 
across the board, as it would provide a tool to plan and better allo-
cate resources on both sides. A bilateral agreement would also reduce 
risks of medical malpractice and complications associated with the 
lack of standardized procedures and regulations of health care ser-
vices delivered abroad. Indeed, formalizing the commissioning of 
health care services to EU member states can solve the many issues 
that have arisen out of unregulated medical tourism. The fl ow of UK 
patients seeking treatment in EU member states, currently considered 
by public authorities as a liability for the NHS, may transform into 
a solution to solve issues of undue delay and limited access to care.
